A

LETTER

FROM

A GENTLEMAN in the Country

TO

His FRIEND in Town.

[Price SIX-PENCE.]

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
On his Perusal of a PAMPHLET

Addressed to TWO GREAT MEN.



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BRITISH MUSEUM

A GENTLEMAN

FROM

FELLER

A

A

LETTER

FROM

A GENTLEMAN in the Country

TO

His FRIEND in Town.

SIR,

THE favourable Reception which you tell me that the Pamphlet entitled, *An Addreſs to two Great Men*, has lately met with, I muſt confeſs, not a little ſurpriſes me; and leaſt you ſhould be equally ſurpriſed at this bold Declaration, I will

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endeavour to give you the Reaſons on which my Objections are founded, in as conciſe a Manner as poſſible. I may, perhaps, be cenſured for venturing to cenſure a Piece which has been ſo highly applauded; but if Reaſon is inſufficient to convince me of its Excellency, the general Opinion of Mankind will never ſway my Judgment. I ſhall begin, therefore, with obſerving what the Author advances, *page* 36, *viz.* That he is no Friend to continental Meaſures in general, eſpecially ſuch continental Meaſures as engaged us during the three laſt Wars as Principals, when we ſeem'd eager to ruin ourſelves in Support of that *Auſtrian* Family, whom we now find with unparallel'd Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in cloſe Alliance with *France*. But the continental Meaſures now adopted by *England* were neceſſary, both with Regard to our Honor, and our Intereſt. *Hanover*, &c. Doth the Change of Name, then, make any Difference? Or is it poſſible to think, that engaging *Great-Britain* in a Continent War,

War, in point of Intereſt, at the Rate of Three or Four Millions * *per Annum*, muſt not in the End prove its Ruin and Deſtruction?

To go certain Lengths in maintaining a War on the Continent in certain Circumſtances, may be wiſe and prudent; but to go ſuch Lengths as we have lately done in our preſent Circumſtances, and are likely to go, in ſupport of continental Meaſures, what is it other than downright Madneſs? In ſhort, if we do not draw ourſelves out of them ſoon, they can't fail proving a Mill-ſtone about our Necks, which will inevitably ſink us.

The firſt and principal Conſideration of a Miniſter, whoſe Buſineſs it is to plan the military Operations of the Public, I have always conceived, was to compute how far the People can, or cannot, ſupport the Expence of whatever Scheme may be projected; and, in the next Place, to weigh and examine how far the Ends propoſed to be attain'd, will anſwer the Means which

* Great Part of this Money, it is to be fear'd, will find its Way into *France*.

may be neceſſary to make Uſe of in order to attain ſuch and ſuch Ends; and, farther, to deliberate, and carefully judge of the Probability of ſuch an Undertaking, as a Miniſter may determine upon as fitteſt to be executed, being crown'd with Succeſs: For if we ſhould fail in any one of theſe Points, the Expence we are now at is ſo great, we ſhall be obliged in the End to abandon all our Conqueſts.

This, then, is the only fair Light in which this continental Meaſure can be conſider'd with any Propriety; for to aſſert, that merely by diverting the Attention of *France* on the Continent, we have been able to effect ſuch Conqueſts as have been made, is begging the Queſtion; and the Ball may be return'd by affirming, on the other Side, that if we had not been ſo deeply engaged on the Continent, we might have extended our Conqueſts in the *Weſt-Indies* even farther than we have done; and that St. *Do-*

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mingo and *Martinico* would, probably, have undergone, before this Time, the ſame Fate as *Guadaloupe* and *Louiſburgh*; for that it would not have been in the Enemy's Power, whilſt we had a Superiority at Sea, to have warded off the Blow; and that the ſame Money which we expended on the Continent, would always have enabled us to maintain that Superiority, with this Advantage, that the whole Money in this laſt Caſe would center in ourſelves. Thus this grand Queſtion might be banded to and fro without being proved on either Side: But conſider it in its proper Light, and we ſhall find too much Reaſon to be convinced that no Meaſure could poſſibly tend more to riſk the total Ruin of this Country than engaging ourſelves in the Manner we are at preſent engaged: For if it is certain, that if any private Perſon's annual Outgoings far exceeds his annual Income, he muſt neceſſarily be ſooner or later undone. Is not the ſame Rule equally true applied

plied to this, or any other Country? If our national Expenditure, during the War, (and who knows when there will be a Period put to it) annually exceeds the Profits ariſing from Trade near Two Millions* Sterling, which, I believe, will ſcarce be denied, what can we expect in the Courſe of a few Years but a State of national Bankruptcy? Nay, if the War was to have an End Tomorrow, what a Load will it not leave on the Shoulders of every Individual? Is it poſſible then that Gentlemen themſelves in the Adminiſtration can look calmly on this Meaſure which we are now purſuing, and not ſhudder at its Conſequences? Happy, for my Part, ſhall I think ourſelves, if in the End it ſhould not oblige us to abandon all our preſent Conqueſts, and ſubmit to an inglorious aud ignominious Peace.

Consider further the little Probability which there is of our meeting with Succeſs on

* Not only the Money which the Continent War coſts us extraordinary, but our Payments of Intereſts to Forreigners, &c. is to be conſider'd in the Article of Outgoings.

on the Continent, and you will find that even the Author himſelf, as great an Advocate as he is for continental Meaſures, makes it Matter of Doubt.

So many great Powers as are united at preſent againſt the King of *Pruſſia*, muſt at laſt run him down. However gloriouſly he may fall in his own Defence, fall he muſt; it is not in our Power (if other Powers are in earneſt) to ſave him; and if it was, it is by no means the Intereſt of this Country, that any Prince of the Empire ſhould be ſo near upon a Par, in Point of Power, with the Head of the Empire; becauſe *France* in that Caſe will always play one againſt the other, and will alternately be making Advantages of each; whereas the Empire united will always prove a ſufficient Balance to the Power of *France*. What then are we about, but idly waſting our Blood and Treaſure in giving him an ineffectual Aſſiſtance only, which too we can ſo little

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ſpare at this Time, that whilſt we proeraſtinate his Ruin we haſten our own? On the other Hand, What Shadow of Pretence is there for *Hanover* aſking Aſſiſtance of *Great-Britain*, after breaking through the Treaty of *Cloiſter-Seven*, which was the wiſeſt and moſt advantageous Treaty that could have been contrived in Reſpect of this Country, and even *Hanover* itſelf? I would to God that the *Hanoverians* had more religiouſly obſerved it; but they have violated their Faith on this Occaſion. Oh *England!* Oh my Country! Before that Time, neither Honour nor Juſtice ever required it of us to exert ourſelves beyond our Abilities, nor could it be expected that we ſhould ſtarve any more important Service on that Account. It is, beſides, a Queſtion with me, if the Elector of *Hanover* might not long before have made a Treaty of Neutrality, on Condition of abandoning the King of *Pruſſia*, which if he might have done, this Continent War has been a downright *German* War, and not a *Hanoverian* one only, founded on

a Quarrel intirely *Engliſh*. Admit, however, that the *Hanoverian* Affair has been rightly ſtated by the Author of the Pamphlet; ought not his Majeſty's Miniſters here, even in that Caſe, to conſider how much he owes to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, and that his immenſe Civil Liſt bears no Part of thoſe heavy Taxes which his People ſuffer, who fight in his Cauſe as well as their own. But if, touch'd with his Majeſty's Misfortunes as Elector of *Hanover*, (and who is there that doth not feel for his Majeſty on this Occaſion) we had thought it incumbent on us to have conſider'd them, might we not at a cheaper Rate have, in ſome degree, made him Satisfaction, by granting him a Sum of Money, than by undertaking to defend his Country? eſpecially as we might be aſſured that the *Germanic* Body would not ſuffer *France* to keep Poſſeſſion of it: Nay, might we not ſtill oblige the Enemy, e'er we liſten to Terms of Peace, to indemnifie the Electorate for the Loſſes which ſhe has ſuſtain'd during

the War, which if notified to the *French* when they firſt meditated an Invaſion of *Hanover*, would have render'd them, undoubtedly, cautious of making that Country a Deſert?

I COME now to conſider the ſole Equivalent which has been pointed out to us by the Author upon an approaching Peace for that immenſe Expence which we have put ourſelves to pending the War, and whether *Canada* alone is to be deem'd an adequate Conſideration for ſo many Millions as we have expended, and ſo many more Millions as we may chance to expend before the War ſhall be finiſh'd.

To render this Place of the utmoſt Importance, we are told of the Danger which our Settlers are expoſed to by being elbow'd out of their Poſſeſſions by the *Canadians*. But what Regard is to be paid to ſuch bugbear Arguments, when it is notorious that our *American* Settlers are not only a hardy, war-

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like Race, but that they out-number the *Canadians* almoſt Twenty to One, and all they wanted for their Defence was military Stores and a little Money. Again, we are told of the Savages, and of their ſavage Treatment of our People, as if they acted only by *French* Inſtigation; but is it to be expected that their Nature ſhould be at once changed, and that on the *French* giving up all Pretenſions to *Canada*, we ſhould hear no more of any horrid Barbarities committed by thoſe Savages? One may almoſt as ſoon expect to ſee the Lion and the Lamb innocently playing together. Time, indeed, may chance to civilize them: But Out-Settlers muſt always be ſubject to many Inconveniencies which it is impoſſible to avoid in a Country uninhabited, or inhabited only by wild Indians. What Sort of Country it is, the Author himſelf has reſolved you in the moſt lively Terms: The Inclemency, ſays he, of the Climate, the difficult Acceſs to it, and a Trade ſcarcely defraying the Expence of the Colony, would

long ago have induced the *French* to abandon it, if the Plan of extending its Boundaries at the Expence of the *Engliſh*, and of opening its Communication with *Louiſiana*, had not made them perſevere. *Canada* itſelf is not worth their aſking. Is then this Country to be deem'd an Equivalent for the immenſe Expence which we have put ourſelves to during the War? The very Charges of garriſoning *Quebec* we ſhould find would prove no inconſiderable Article, if the *French* were to cede it to us. For my Part I can't think that the Profits ariſing from it would in any Degree defray even the Charges of keeping it. Beſides it would very little add to our Naval Power, which is, or ought to be, our principal Object: for the whole Trade at preſent doth not employ above ſix or eight Ships annually, and the Commodities, which are moſtly Furrs, ſcarce exceed 200,000 *l.* in Value. And if Poſſeſſion of the Country ſhould ever lead us into the Thoughts of ſettling it, we ſhall become ſtill greater

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Sufferers by draining our own of its Inhabitants. In ſhort, in whatever Light I conſider it, I can't help perſuading myſelf that if that Country only ſhould remain to us of all our Conqueſts after ſo many Millions ſpent (if I may call that a Conqueſt where ſo much is ſtill wanting to be done) it will be very dearly purchaſed. In the mean it is not to be doubted but that we ſhall keep Poſſeſſion of the Forts of *Niagara*, *Crown Point*, &c.

At all Times, but moſt eſpecially at this Juncture, it behoves us to conſider what we have moſt Reaſon to apprehend of *France*, which, if I rightly conceive, is her becoming our Rival at Sea.: Of this we can never be too jealous; and on this Point ought all our State Policy to reſt in treating with our Enemy. The Reſult of which Apprehenſion leads us to conſider how that Danger may be beſt averted; and I may venture to affirm, that it can no other Way be ſo ſecurely effected as by poſſeſſing ourſelves of the whole, or great Part at leaſt,

of

of her Fiſhing and Sugar Iſlands, which has enabled her to maintain ſo great a Number of Sailors. Deprive her of theſe, and ſhe can never riſe again to hurt us.

No longer ago than 1630, the *French* had ſcarce any Shipping, inſomuch that they were obliged to hire Veſſels upon almoſt every Occaſion; but in little more than half a Century, after her Fiſhing and Sugar Iſlands began to flouriſh, ſhe made ſuch a rapid Progreſs in Naval Affairs, that *France* alone, under the Influence of that great Genius Monſieur *Colbert*, was Miſtreſs of a Fleet, almoſt equal, if not ſuperior, to the *Hollanders* and our own. Would it be good Policy then to reſtore to her thoſe Iſlands onwhich her Naval Strength has been cheifly founded.

I AM ſorry, I muſt confeſs, to differ from a Perſon of ſuch great Knowledge and Experience in public Affairs as the Author of the Pamphlet ſeems to be; but I can't help thinking that his Propoſal of giving up

every

every thing except *Canada*, is the leaſt advantageous Propoſal that could poſſibly have been made on ſettling Terms of Peace in Favour of this Country; and I hope that nothing but the laſt Neceſſity will ever oblige us to yield up any of the Enemy's Iſlands. But, undoubtedly, much will depend on the Circumſtances which we may be in at the Time of making Peace. I can't help, nevertheleſs, obſerving, that if we confined ourſelves to a naval War, we might go on for Ages, and inſtead of loſing, we may be ſure of gaining Strength, and of reducing our Enemy to our own Terms.

The Poſſeſſion of *Guadaloupe*, an additional Sugar Iſland, when we have ſo many of our own, ſays this Gentleman, ought not to be inſiſted upon ſo ſtrenuouſly as to make it a Condition of Peace. But give me Leave to obſerve, that that Iſland alone employs a great Number of Ships, and that all the Iſlands which we have at preſent ſcarce produces Sugar enough to

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ſupply our home Conſumption, which has been occaſion'd by the immenſe Increaſe of our domeſtic Conſumption of that Commodity. Of how great Uſe, therefore, that Iſland would be to us, not only in Regard to an Increaſe of Seamen, but of Riches, we may eaſily judge: For it is our Exports only, not our Imports, which inrich a Country. If, indeed, we could gain *Hiſpaniola*, or, at leaſt, that Part of it which has been ceded to the *French*, we might be under leſs Concern in regard to our other Conqueſts whether we gave them up or not, as the Increaſe of Seamen which we ſhould have in conſequence of being in Poſſeſſion of ſo rich a Country, would naturally put us above any Apprehenſions of the Enemy's ever having a Superiority of us at Sea. And here give me Leave to apply the Author's Motto:——There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men, which, taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune, omitted all the Voyage of their Life, is bound in Shallows and in Miſeries. On ſuch a Sea we are now afloat, *&c.*

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As to *Louiſbourg*, St. *John*'s, and other Fiſhing Iſlands, they are to be eſtimated only by the Number of Ships which their reſpective Trades employ. But this Conſideration ought always to have a proper Regard paid to it, that they can never be retaken as long as we have a Superiority at Sea, and which, as long as we maintain, I hope we ſhall never be ſo fooliſh, or ſo frighten'd, as to make our Enemy ſuch a Compliment. But, notwithſtanding, if it ſhould become a Meaſure of Government to ſurrender up *Louiſburgh*, I am of Opinion with the Author of the Pamphlet, and I have ſaid the ſame Thing a great while ago, that we ought to diſmantle it. One Thing more I could alſo wiſh, which is, that the *French* may be totally deprived, by a future Treaty, from curing their Fiſh on any Part of *Newfoundland*. I ſhall only add in regard to *Louiſburgh*, that, according to Monſieur *Charlevoix*, they have Plenty of Coal there, which, if true, may, hereafter, prove of much greater Importance than the

Fiſhery: Beſides, by keeping it in our Hands it will always prove a ſtrong Check upon *France*, in caſe ſhe ſhould ever think in a future War of ſending Troops to moleſt any of our Settlements in *North America*.

As to *Oſtend* and *Newport* they are paltry Objects conſider'd in regard to any of the Enemy's Iſlands which we are already in Poſſeſſion of.

In a Word: Great as our national Debt is become, (and great it is, God knows!) *England* has, notwithſtanding, never ſeen a more glorious Æra than the preſent, take it in the View of our great Succeſſes both at Land and Sea; to improve which, it is incumbent on our preſent Miniſtry to be no leſs ſenſible of our Diſadvantages than our Advantages, and to labour with all their Might to extricate us out of our continental Engagements, without which we ſhall, moſt probably, like *Siſiphus* his Stone, tumble precipitately from the Summit of our Glory. But if

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once extricated from the Continent, they ſhall proceed to act with the ſame Spirit as they have done in other Affairs, by puſhing the War againſt the Enemy's Iſlands, they can't fail of raiſing this Nation to a much higher Pitch of Honor, Riches, and Dominion, than is to be found in any other Period of the Annals of *Great-Britain*: But even then the Work we ſhall find will be but half done: For it ſtill remains that the two great Men, if they continue in Power, (and I hope, for the Sake of their Country, that they may continue in Power) ſhould diligently apply themſelves to the Works of Peace, whenever it happens, and that they become Nurſing Fathers to the Conſtitution, which ſome unhappy Circumſtances of our preſent Situation (to uſe the Author's own Words) have already greatly changed, and ſeem to threaten with Deſtruction. I heartily therefore join with him in hoping that they will neglect nothing in their Power to promote this great and neceſſary Work, by availing themſelves not only of every Means of improving

proving the Revenue, but by reducing every idle and ſhameful Expence of Places, Penſions, and exorbitant Contracts, which, I am ſorry to ſay at this Time of Diſtreſs, are infinite. And more particularly I hope, as the Author does, (for in that Reſpect he is greatly to be commended) that they will make it a Point, one of the firſt Things they do, to remove all national Apprehenſions of Danger from a military Government, (which, however, is not to be fear'd under his preſent Majeſty's moſt auſpicious Reign) by a proper and ſeaſonable Reduction of the Army.

I am SIR, &c.



FINIS.

POSTSCRIPT.

I SHALL not diſpute with the Author the the Advantages of the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, but I can't help thinking that by proper Convoys, and a proper Diſpoſition of the Navy, our Trade may be ſo well carried on in ſpite of the *Dunkirkers*, that we need not inſiſt on the Demolition of it ſo ſtrenuouſly, provided we can obtain Things of more Importance, as to make it the *ſine qua non* Condition of a future Peace.